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Abstract1 
Only three weeks after the events of September 11th 2001, Aaron Sorkin’s ‘The West Wing’ 
delivered a special one off episode, outside of usual storylines.  The episode, titled ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael’, is interesting because it adopts an explicitly pedagogical theme to teach viewers 
how to think about the event of 9-11.  The episode can thus be read as an instance in the 
wider construction of the meaning of those events.  In this respect, this article argues that the 
production of the episode contributed to notions of rupture and exceptionalism.  In addition, 
despite the potentially ‘liberal’ and ‘academic’ lessons given by the show’s stars, the 
extensive contextualisation of the previously incomprehensible events for a dominantly 
American audience actually relayed, amplified and reinforced the emerging dominant 
discourses of the Bush Administration.  Accepting and repeating official tropes, The West 
Wing ultimately served to further limit space for debate in the wake of 9-11. 
 
1. Introduction 
On October 3rd 2001, three weeks after the events of September 11th, episode 0 series 3 of 
NBC’s The West Wing aired in the United States.  Attempting to confront the events of 
September 11th head on, this episode was remarkable in a number of ways.  First, the show’s 
creator, Aaron Sorkin, deemed it necessary to produce an episode (the only episode ever) that 
did not follow the ongoing plotlines of the popular series.  Interpreted as an exceptional event 
and moment of temporal rupture, The West Wing responded to 9-11 with an exceptional 
episode and a temporal rupture of their own.  Second, having been produced in only two 
weeks and written in only two or three days, the episode presented a ‘formidable logistical 
challenge for the directors, editors and cast’, who were left ‘scrambling to meet a virtually 
unprecedented production schedule’.2  Third, the speed of this televisual ‘response’ to the 
events in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania ensured that it ‘was the first TV show to 
address the events and aftermath of 9/11’.3  Fourth, the West Wing achieved extremely high 
viewing figures of approximately twenty-eight million (an 18/26 rating/share), ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael’ received the show’s highest ever viewing figures and was the most watched 
programme in the United States that week.4  Fifth, the show was met with a generally 
polarised critical and popular reception.  While some noted that it felt like ‘op-ed’ TV and 
others found it ‘preachy’, these readings of the one-off ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ episode were in 
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the minority amongst the general public, with most reviews voicing positive readings and 
warm approval for the show’s attempt to tackle the issue dominating US politics and society 
at the time.5  Approximately forty per cent found the show sufficiently engaging to afford it 
the highest possible ratings, awarding ten stars out of ten, with the episode declared a ‘Wing-
ed Victory’ despite some critics arguing that Sorkin had ‘wimped out on terror’.6  In general, 
reviewers found the episode to be ‘very informative’ and helpful in ‘clarifying issues after 9-
11’.7   
‘I loved this episode coz I think it wonderfully manages to walk the fine line of 
honouring the events of 9/11 while still reasonably and calmly talking about what 
happened and why. A very educated and informative episode!’8 
Against this background, the episode arguably offers ‘the perfect example of knowledge 
transfer and emancipative anti-racist education’.9  Mining traditional liberal themes of 
cosmopolitanism and understanding, the episode represents an attempt to forge a broadly 
‘liberal response’ to the events of 9-11 at a time when these alternative voices had generally 
fallen silent.10  This article argues that far from offering distinct interpretations, framings and 
responses to September 11th, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ instead helped to reinforce official emerging 
narratives and invalidate alternatives.  In this respect, understanding both the production and 
reception of ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ requires that the episode be ‘re-contextualised’ within the 
post 9-11 moment, characterised by an initial ‘void in meaning’ and a subsequent 
construction of crisis of which ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was ultimately a part.11  Placed back into 
this tumultuous moment, it becomes apparent that the purportedly ‘liberal response’ 
articulated in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ is limited and limiting.  No fewer than sixteen dominant 
tropes are invoked, the most significant twelve of which are discussed here.  These tropes 
gave credence to official narratives and narrowed the space for debate in the wake of 9-11.  
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ ultimately served to reinforce the Bush Administration’s response to the 
events of September 11th, simultaneously helping to silence dissent along the way.  In this, 
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sadly, The West Wing was typical of the broader ‘liberal’ response to 9-11.12  As a powerful, 
popular and emotive television series, The West Wing was able to make important 
contributions to political (im)possibility. Powerful entertainment programmes have the ability 
to widen the space for debate and challenge dominant orthodoxies.  In light of this 
recognition, it is particularly noteworthy that ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ contributed to a narrowing 
of political dialogue after 9-11.  In ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, The West Wing reflected (and 
arguably helped to drive) calls for a more muscular liberalism in the realm of foreign policy 
after September 11th 2001.13 
 
2. Context: Filling the Post 9-11 Discursive Void 
Temporality was and has been of crucial significance to making sense of the events of 
September 11th 2001.  Notwithstanding clichéd narratives of ‘night falling on a different 
world’ and 9-11 as ‘the day the world changed’, it is apparent that for the majority of United 
States citizens the events clearly marked and heralded a moment of temporal rupture.14  
Transformed into passive ‘viewers’, Americans struggled to make sense of the unfolding 
events as they seemed to contradict the existing truths of US security culture and few 
authorised voices were forthcoming in explaining the situation to a bewildered public.  As I 
have argued elsewhere, the wrong (the disproving of perceived security truths) and the lack 
(the failure to narrate) were the twin arms of the void that held Americans in a stunned, silent 
embrace.15	  	  	  
	  
On the first arm, American security culture had long promulgated myths of invulnerability 
and invincibility.  Although peaking in the ‘unipolar moment’ of the 1990s, with declarations 
of the ‘end of history’, the popular image of being separated from the dangers and corruption 
of the rest of the world was an enduring myth in American politics and society.16  Tracing to 
the Monroe Doctrine and beyond, Americans had long considered themselves blessed by God 
with the protection of two vast oceans.17  The events of September 11th took place against this 
predominant understanding of America’s blessed geography and were subsequently met with 
spatial and temporal distanciation.  Events were frequently denied and disregarded as either 
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news from some other country or from some previous time; Americans struggled to accept 
that the events were happening ‘now’ and they were happening ‘here’.18 
 
On the second arm, the incomprehensibility of (what would later become) ‘9-11’ arose due to 
the difficulty, and often impossibility, of subsuming the events within existing frameworks of 
intelligibility.  The events of September 11th were ‘unspeakable’ as Americans lacked an 
appropriate language to describe what they were seeing.19  Unlike, for example, British, 
Spanish or Sri Lankan experiences, Americans lacked a language for the illegitimate use of 
large-scale, external violence on domestic soil.20  The lack of an appropriate language to 
make sense of 9-11 meant that cues were frequently taken from unofficial sources and 
‘lower’ levels of cultural life.  Religion and films were frequently drawn upon as initial 
American attempts to comprehend 9-11 took place at the level of the individual in contrast to 
the more commonplace intersubjective understandings that are produced through discursive 
regularities.21  The resulting discursive void – as a lack of shared meaning regulated by an 
overarching narrative – saw a plethora of competing and fragmentary understandings in place 
of more commonplace harmonised meaning.  In short, the cultural shock of 9-11 was 
compounded by the emptiness of the space usually occupied by assured ‘official’ voices. 
 
These twin arms – the wrong and the lack – then represent an inability to comprehend and an 
inability to articulate.  If discursive failure is symptomatic of what Campbell has termed the 
‘void in meaning’, it is the cultural shock that is symptomatic of what Edkins has termed 
‘trauma’.22  Succinctly, 9-11 invalidated notions of anarchy, chaos and danger existing only 
beyond the borders of the United States.  Falling outside of expected and predictable patterns 
of politics and everyday life, 9-11 was a traumatic event in that it was seen to demand a 
response.  The insistence on a response outside of usual politics reflected the reading and 
experience of 9-11 as having occurred beyond politics-as-usual.  It was this demand – even 
yearning – to be communicated and to ‘reply’ that generated such acute tension, as the void 
was marked by the very difficulty of communicating what had happened for the public.  It 
was in this tension that President Bush had begun to articulate an official response and Aaron 
Sorkin wrote, directed and produced ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, outside of The West Wing 
continuity.   
 
3. The West Wing 
The West Wing first aired on NBC in September 1999, going on to run over seven series.  The 
show drew high audiences – the finale of series two attracted over twenty million viewers in 
the United States – and was critically acclaimed, winning three Golden Globes and twenty-
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seven Emmy Awards.23  Although the show’s creators, including Sorkin, were adamant that 
they were creating a work of fiction, numerous real-world parallels were evident from the 
start.  Mockingly referred to by the American Right as ‘The Left Wing’, these parallels were 
initially most evident with the Clinton White House.24  Waxman noted the ease of reading 
key characters as counterparts of Clinton Administration officials: Sam Seaborn as George 
Stephanopoulis; Josh Lyman as Paul Begala; and C.J. Cregg as Dee Dee Myers.25  Along 
with numerous other real life politicians and practitioners, Dee Dee Myers actually served as 
a consultant for the show.  And throughout the seven series, the show frequently dealt with 
issues paralleling those that had faced the previous Clinton Administration or that continued 
to challenge the Bush White House. 
 
The show’s liberal leanings and optimistic outlook meant that reviews were not always 
positive.  The West Wing was mocked in the Weekly Standard and Atlantic Monthly as 
‘nothing more or less than political pornography for liberals’, the ‘ultimate Hollywood 
fantasy: the Clinton White House without Clinton’ and naively ‘Capra-esque’ ‘pseudo-
politics’.26  With a ‘tacit mission of the revival of lagging liberal spirits’, right-leaning critics 
were aware that The West Wing was no more than a ‘cultural platform for the revival of 
liberal politics in America’.27  While that may have been true, it was clearly nonetheless a 
platform that even the most sceptical critics took seriously, as evidenced by the perceived 
need to comment on and ridicule the popular show.  And after 9-11 it was a platform that 
would be used to give voice to a largely non-existent ‘liberal response’ to terrorism.  That 
response came in the form of ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. 
 
Isaac and Ishmael 
The choice of title is itself interesting and revealing.  As elaborated in the episode, ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael’ refers to a contested interpretation of the story of Abraham.  The West Wing chose 
to emphasise that ‘what most people find important to remember is, in the end, the two sons’, 
Isaac and Ishmael, ‘came together’.  This emphasis on unity and ‘coming together’ through 
the analogy of a story contested in Christian, Jewish and Islamic thought was largely 
welcomed in the United States and mirrored President Bush’s own repeated appeals for 
national unity.  The choice of title does, however, indicate a reading and framing of 
September 11th through a religious lens rather than a political one.  Religious metaphors 
risked constructing a particularly intractable problem and de-politicising the events of 
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September 11th.  These twin moves would ultimately be reinforced throughout the episode, 
centring on the notion that the United States was attacked because of who they are, not what 
they have done. 
 
From the very beginning, it was clear that ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was not a usual episode of The 
West Wing.  Viewers were made aware of the exceptional nature of the episode and its 
placement outside of the usual West Wing continuity through a number of cues: the episode 
was characterised from the outset by its static filming, in contrast to usual dynamism and 
movement; and, crucially, the episode began with the actors addressing the audience as 
themselves, not their characters.   
Martin Sheen: Good evening, I'm Martin Sheen, and I'm with the cast of The 
West Wing. For those of you who tuned in tonight to see our 
season premiere, I'm afraid you won't. That'll be next week. 
Rob Lowe: We're eager to get back to our continuing storylines, but tonight 
we wanted to stop for a moment and do something different. 
Allison Janney: You'll notice a few things different about this show tonight ... 
Bradley Whitford: ... tonight we offer a play. It's called "Isaac and Ishmael." We 
suggest you don't spend a lot of time trying to figure out where 
this episode comes in the timeline of the series. It doesn't. It's a 
story-telling aberration, if you'll allow. 
Clearly, as Wodak notes, ‘this episode illustrates an explicit intervention into viewers’ 
expectations and possible understandings ... present[ing] a parable intended to make people 
reflect on their beliefs and stereotypes about Muslims and ‘others’ who have become targets 
for aggression after 9/11’.28  This parable is delivered through two parallel stories, told 
concomitantly although not explicitly linked.  The first sees White House Chief-of-Staff, Leo 
McGarry and Head of the President’s Secret Service Detail, Ron Butterfield interrogating a 
‘suspect’.  Having been ‘crashed’, The White House is in a state of ‘lockdown’ and the 
‘suspect’ is aggressively interviewed about his connections to fictional terrorist ‘Kharim 
Sharif’.  The ‘suspect’, Raqim Ali, is held because his name matches a known alias of one of 
Kharim Sharif’s conspirators.  The link is spurious and deliberately so, enabling Sorkin to 
present Leo McGarry’s suspicions of the Muslim, Arab White House employee as grounded 
in racism, prejudice and misplaced fear.   
Ali:  It is not uncommon for Arab-Americans to be the first 
suspected when that kind of thing [terrorist threat] happens.  
Leo:    I can’t imagine why. 
This storyline delivers a classic liberal, Jeffersonian narrative on the need to resist 
discrimination in times of national danger.  It warns against the unchecked concentration of 
power in the hands of the Executive and reminds of the need to resist stereotyping in the face 
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of threat and fear.29  Through this storyline Americans were reminded that the perpetrators of 
the September 11th attacks were nineteen fanatical individuals and therefore, in post 9-11 
America, there is no possibility of ‘reading’ threat from ethnicity or religious affiliation.   If 
this first story is simplistic to the point of being blunt, it is in marked contrast to the parallel 
second story which attempts to capitalise on the show’s cast in their positions as authorised 
experts, capable of articulating and explaining events which had thus far left America’s 
‘brightest and best’ baffled.  It is also in direct contestation with the second imagining and 
construction of the enemy that the show offers.  Just as in the official language of the Bush 
Administration’s response to 9-11, the show presented a tension between understandings of 
the perpetrators as a group of radical individuals and an organised, omnipresent and 
threatening Islamic enemy.30  And just like the Bush Administration, the show struggled to 
sell the former, whilst delivering an exceptionally resonant lesson on the latter.31  If the 
former encourages a response to 9-11 oriented around a constant refusal to stereotype and a 
need to confront prejudice, the latter is central to maintaining support for a ‘War on Terror’; 
indeed, the latter naturalises a response of militaristic interventionism. 
 
The format for the second story, in which this second imagining of the enemy is delivered, is 
in itself noteworthy.  A group of school pupils who have been selected for the ‘Presidential 
Classroom’ scheme are stuck in the White House Mess Hall due to the lockdown.  Starting 
with Josh Lyman, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, the show’s main characters one-
by-one join the group to contribute to a question-and-answer based ‘lesson’ on terrorism.  
Before moving to consider the answers the show gives, it is important to note two points.  
First, the show has afforded the time to ask questions.   
I felt it was appropriate to just take a week and stop ... I was thinking 'Gee, I've really 
got to stop and pause and take a moment.32 
Executive Producer John Wells recognised in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ both the need to respond 
and the need to acknowledge the exceptional nature and temporal rupture that 9-11 wrought. 
‘Obviously, everybody in entertainment and series TV have been trying to figure out 
what's the appropriate response, such as what needs to be said on ‘West Wing’ ...  We 
didn't feel comfortable going back to our fictional White House without taking a 
moment.  Hopefully, we can say something that's useful ... Hopefully, it will make 
people talk and think’.33   
The experience of 9-11 as a traumatic event – as a moment of rupture, outside of normality – 
was recognised in the production of ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ as a stand-alone episode.  Second, 
the decision to frame the episode around knowledgeable, but scared and confused children 
asking questions was recognition of the voiceless-ness of the post 9-11 void.  After the events 
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of September 11th 2001, questions such as ‘why do they hate us’ were commonplace.34  With 
the American public symbolically embodied in school children asking questions about who 
are terrorists and why do they act this way, Sorkin acknowledges and actively reproduces the 
discursive void in meaning that 9-11 induced.  Crucially, the episode also acknowledges and 
reproduces the phase of the War on Terror that would follow.  Despite attempting an 
informed liberal response to terrorism, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ perpetuates the construction of 9-
11 as a crisis through the (re)production of a number of dominant tropes that were beginning 
to define events and fix an increasingly hegemonic meaning to 9-11.  Therefore, not only 
does The West Wing actively reinforce the cultural shock and voicelessness that characterised 
the initial post 9-11 void, but moreover ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ also reaffirms the later 
construction on 9-11 as a moment and marker of crisis by repeating, amplifying and 
contextualising the official narration of the events offered by the Bush Administration.  To 
this end, The West Wing supported the official response to 9-11, helping to both further 
increase the resonance of dominant official narratives and silence dissent by demonstrating 
the apparent convergence of liberal and conservative responses to terrorism. 
 
4. Amplifying Dominant Narratives: The West Wing and 9-11 
‘Isaac and Ishmael’, despite attempting a considered and informative ‘liberal response’ to 
terrorism, reinforced a number of the key tropes that were central to the success of Bush 
Administration policies at the start of the ‘War on Terror’.  These tropes and narratives can 
be grouped into three main themes, based on the central questions they answer: (i) who are 
the terrorists and what do they want?  (ii) What is going on and how should the United States 
respond?  And (iii) what should we do, as citizens? 
 
4.1 Who are the terrorists and what do they want? 
On the first question – who are the terrorists and what do they want? – the show’s stars 
delivered five compelling answers to educate both the fictional pupils and the real world 
American citizens they represented.  First, viewers were reminded that terrorists do want to 
kill American citizens.   
 Girl 1: So... what's the deal with everybody trying to kill you? 
 Josh: Well... it's not everybody, and they're trying to kill you, too. 
In the days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration relied upon the omnipresent threat 
of terrorist attack to pass far-reaching counter-terrorism legislation at home and launch a 
‘War on Terror’ abroad.  This climate of fear was intense and widespread.  For instance, 
despite later revelations of so-called ‘home grown terror’, events such as the 2001 Anthrax 
Attacks were readily interpreted as simply the latest instances and confirmation of an 
unfolding War on Terror.  This was, for example, in evidence as ‘white powder scares’ were 
read through the lens of an emerging and solidifying ‘War on Terror’ discourse.  After one 
such evacuation, many miles from the sites of 9-11, comments included ‘we could see it from 
the inside … the war reached here’.35 In its early stages, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ contributed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order. (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Jackson, Writing; Silberstein, War of Words. 
35 S. Tulk, uncatalogued sound recording, Witness and Response Collection, Library of Congress, Washington 
D.C., (2001). 
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this tendency to read events through narratives of ‘terror’ and the unease they generated, 
before moving to address resultant fears.  Thus, second, Americans were assured that despite 
wanting to kill them, terrorists always fail.   
 Girl 1: You know a lot about terrorism? 
 Sam:  I dabble. 
 Girl 1: What are you struck by most? 
 Sam:  It's 100% failure rate. 
 Girl 1: Really? 
 Sam:  Not only do terrorists always fail at what they're after, they pretty much 
always succeed in strengthening whatever it is they're against. 
As President Bush assured Americans of ‘our victory, not theirs’, The West Wing joined him 
in reassuring citizens that this new form of terrorism would ‘follow in the path of fascism, 
Nazism and totalitarianism’ to ‘history's unmarked grave of discarded lies’.36  This assurance 
was important in confirming that a response to 9-11 of ‘War on Terror’ was the correct path 
to follow.  It helped to reassure wavering support and silence doubters.   
 
Third, assured of terrorist failure, The West Wing delivered its most noteworthy answer to 
‘who are they?’   
 Josh: You're juniors and seniors.  In honour of the SAT's you're about to take, 
answer the following question. Islamic... extremist... is to... Islamic... as... 
"blank" is... to Christianity. 
 Josh writes this on the board for the students, before turning around, writing 
"KKK" and circling it. 
 Josh:  That's what we're talking about. It's the Klan, gone medieval and global. 
This contextualisation of the unnamed Al Qaeda helped to explain the terrorist network to the 
population in a way that the Bush Administration had been struggling to achieve.37  
Eventually and inevitably, the Bush Administration would draw upon the usual reference 
points – National Socialism and Communism – still synonymous with evil in American 
political culture.  Addressing Congress, Bush warned Americans that ‘[t]housands of 
dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are 
now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning’, but 
that this terrorist evil would go the way of those other evils America had previously faced 
down.38  However, in the first few days and weeks after 9-11, the Bush Administration faced 
the difficult task of articulating this ‘new’ and ‘unprecedented’ enemy that would inevitably 
be defeated.  Repeated references to terrorists hating freedom, hiding in caves and being evil 
were made (e.g. Bush 2001c; 2001d), but arguably none of these framings contextualised the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 George. W. Bush, ‘Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
37 On initial difficulties in creating compelling narratives, see for instance David Frum, The Right Man: An 
inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003). 
38 George. W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, Capitol Building, Washington D.C. January 29, 2002; 
George. W. Bush, ‘Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
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threat and nature of Al Qaeda as succinctly, powerfully or persuasively as The West Wing’s 
KKK analogy.39  This analogy also reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of moral 
equivalencies being drawn as Josh stated that because they ‘are not blowing stuff up’ the 
Christian Right cannot be the correct answer.  Again, the Bush Administration were at pains 
in the days after 9-11 to invalidate moral equivalencies being drawn between American 
foreign policy and terrorist actions, as well as Christian evangelical groups and Islamic 
fundamentalism.40  In both of these tasks, The West Wing helped to reinforce and sustain the 
efforts of the Bush Administration, further narrowing the space for debate and chances of 
alternative framings in the post 9-11 moment.  Deeming questions of imperial blowback and 
Christian or Western hypocrisy off limits, the Bush Administration was aided and abetted by 
the cast of The West Wing, who ensured Americans knew that fellow citizens and their 
nation’s foreign policy were not to blame.   
  
Fourth, The West Wing confirmed that even if terrorists do have grievances with US foreign 
policy they cannot possibly be justified.  Thus, despite offering a partial counter-reading that 
was generally placed off-limits by official narratives, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ confirms that 
terrorists target the United States because of American identity and values.  Like the Bush 
Administration, The West Wing reassured Americans that they were attacked ‘because we are 
the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world’, but that they should not 
worry because ‘no one will keep that light from shining’.41 
 Girl 1: Why are Islamic Extremists trying to kill us? 
 Josh:  That's a reasonable question if ever I heard one. Why are we targets of 
war?  
 Boy 2: Because we're Americans. 
 Josh: That's it? 
 Girl 3:  Because of our freedom? 
 Josh: No other reasons?  
 Boy 3:  Freedom and democracy. 
 Josh:  I'll tell you, right or wrong - and I think they're wrong - it's probably a 
good idea to acknowledge that they do have specific complaints. I hear 
them every day – the people we support, troops in Saudi Arabia, sanctions 
against Iraq, support for Egypt. It's not just that they don't like Irving 
Berlin. 
 Donna: Yes, it is. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 George. W. Bush, ‘Remarks by the President to Airline Employees’, O’Hare Airport. September 27, 2001; 
George. W. Bush, ‘Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan in Photo Opportunity’, 
The Colonnade. September 25, 2001. 
40 For example, George. W. Bush, ‘Ridge Sworn in to Lead Dept of Homeland Security’, The White House, 
Washington D.C. October 8, 2001.  Bush invoked narratives of a benign and reluctant superpower, arguing that 
September 11th ‘roused a mighty giant’. He also argued that Christian evangelicals in the United States were ‘at 
prayer’ with Jews and Muslims, unlike the ‘evildoers’ who lacked the ‘treasure[d]… values,  the freedoms and 
the character of the American people’. See, for instance, George. W. Bush, ‘Remarks by the President to Airline 
Employees’, O’Hare Airport. September 27, 2001. 
41 George. W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation’, The White House, Washington D.C. September 11, 2001. 
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 Josh:  No, it's not.  
 Donna:  No, not about Irving Berlin, but your ridiculous search for rational reasons 
why somebody straps a bomb to their chest is ridiculous. 
Despite relying on Josh’s supposedly superior, more considered and authoritative male logic 
as representative of the liberal voice of reason over Donna’s more irrational and scared 
female voice, this remains one of the more critical readings that ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ offers in 
an attempt to recognise that terrorists might not be motivated purely by hatred.  The strategy 
is repeated later in the episode to again represent the two competing discourses that emerged 
in the post 9-11 void: ‘imperial blowback’ and ‘they hate our freedoms’.  Portraying an 
enemy motivated by pure hatred, rather than any political grievance (justified or otherwise), 
ensured that questions of American blame were kept ‘off the table’ and beyond the limits of 
acceptable reflection after 9-11.  While ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was clearly more prepared to 
discuss the possibility of terrorist grievances than official narratives, The West Wing 
ultimately comes down strongly on the side of ‘they hate our freedoms’ over ‘imperial 
blowback’ in terms of understanding the drivers of terrorist violence.  The conclusion that 
both the Bush Administration and The West Wing lead American citizens towards is that 
while terrorists may have grievances, they are never legitimate and fighting terrorists is 
always about ensuring freedom. 
 Toby: Well, what would you say the point of fighting terrorism is? 
 C.J.: It's to insure freedom, Pokey. I don't need the brochure. 
And, with freedom as the essence of American-ness, ‘War on Terror’ became an inevitable 
response.  As Bush bluntly put it: ‘We understand the enemy. We understand their hatreds. 
We know they hate freedom. We know we love freedom and we know we're not going to 
change in our love for freedom’.42  Framing 9-11 as an attack on freedom, with confronting 
terror logically presented as freedom’s defence, helped to ensure that Sorkin ultimately aided 
Bush in locking the United States into a logic whereby a ‘War on Terror’ was the only and 
unavoidable response to the events of September 11th 2001. 
 
Fifth, to reinforce the point that fighting terrorists is always and inevitably about defending 
freedom, Toby confirms how Americans should think about the Taleban and Afghanistan. 
 Toby: When you think of Afghanistan, think of Poland. When you think of the 
Taliban, think of the Nazis. When you think of the citizens of Afghanistan, 
think of the Jews in concentration camps.  
To the question ‘who are they and what do they want?’  The West Wing leaves us with the 
over-lexicalised answer that Al Qaeda are the KKK, the Taleban are the Nazis and both want 
to exterminate us and our freedoms, as they are already doing to ordinary Afghani citizens.  
Using these commonly understood reference points, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ teaches Americans 
little that the Bush Administration had not already sanctioned for public consumption.  In the 
same way that Josh performs the role of America’s teacher in circling the ‘KKK’, Toby 
actively lectures and implores Americans – so clearly represented in the school children – to 
think in particular, far-fetched and dangerous ways.  Just as the Bush Administration relied 
upon the most commonly understood markers of evil in American political culture – National 
Socialism and Communism – The West Wing explicitly directed viewers to draw comparisons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 George. W. Bush, ‘Campaign Speech in Pennsylvania’, Pennsylvania, November 1, 2002. 
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between Germany during the Third Reich and Afghanistan under Taleban rule.  This is a 
highly consequential analogy that does more than mark out the Taleban as evil.  
Appeasement and the lessons of Munich are well understood in American political culture.  
By drawing a direct comparison with Hitler’s Germany, confronting evil trough militaristic 
intervention in Afghanistan is rendered the only logical, moral and responsible course of 
action. 
 
4.2 What is going on and how should the United States respond? 
Having answered the first question, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ broaches a second, addressing the 
broader situation: ‘What is going on and how should the United States respond?’  In 
response, the cast offers three important and increasingly commonplace tropes.  First, Josh re-
assures the pupils and the watching public that killing terrorists is acceptable: 
 Pupil: Do you favor the death penalty? 
 Josh: No. 
 Pupil: But you think we should kill these people? 
 Josh: You don't have the choices in a war that you do in a jury room. But I wish 
we didn't have to. I think death is too simple. 
A liberal response then regrets having to kill America’s enemies, but acknowledges that the 
‘law paradigm’ does not apply here.  For Josh, these were acts of war and it is necessary to 
switch to a ‘war paradigm’ to fight back and keep America safe.  C.J. Cregg backs up this 
position in a discussion of civil liberties and security: 
 C.J.:   Look, I talk civil liberties as seriously as anybody, okay? I've been to the 
dinners and we haven't even talked about free speech yet and somebody 
getting lynched by the patriotism police for voicing a minority opinion. 
That said, Tobus, we're going to have to do some stuff. We're going to 
have to tap some phones and we're going to have to partner with some 
people who are the lesser of evils. I'm sorry but terrorists don't have 
armies and navies. They don't have capitals. Some of these guys we're 
going to have to walk up to them and shoot them. Yeah, we can root 
terrorist nests but some of these guys aren't going to be taken by the 105th 
armoured tank division. Some of these guys are going to be taken by a 
busboy with a silencer. So it's time to give the intelligence agencies the 
money and the manpower they need. We don't hear about their successes. 
Guess what? The Soviets never crossed the Elbe. The North Koreans 
stayed behind the 38th parallel. During the Millennium? Not one incident. 
Do you think that's because the terrorists decided that'd be a good day to 
take off? Not much action that day?  
For C.J. the liberty-security debate is a ‘no brainer’; faced with an existential terrorist threat, 
Americans should increase defence funding and widen the scope for intelligence officers to 
act.  After 9-11, these are particularly significant arguments to make. On 26th October 2001 
the USA Patriot Act was passed, which established far-reaching legislation to enable 
controversial ‘counter-terrorism’ measures such as ‘roving wiretaps’, property searches and 
extended periods of detention for suspected terrorists. On 25th November 2001 the 
Department of Homeland Security was established with a budget rising from $20 billion in 
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2002 to $40 billion the following year.43  That C.J., as the show’s most prominent female 
character, made these points is also noteworthy.  In post 9-11 America, ‘soccer moms’ were 
seen to be a new and crucial political and electoral group.  Previously Democratic, but now 
primarily concerned about their children’s safety, this group were seen to represent the 
growing concerns of American women about the threat posed by terrorism.  They were seen 
to favour strong anti-terrorism measures, at the expense of civil liberties, in order to pursue 
the ‘no brainer’ of keeping American children safe.44  As a result, ‘soccer moms’ were 
increasingly identified as ‘security moms’.  Thus, like the Bush Administration, The West 
Wing actively contributed to the birth of this psephological grouping by helping to construct 
‘security’ as the new women’s issue.45 
 
Second, in answer to ‘how should the United States respond?’ the pupils are reassured that 
America has friends; and that coalition-building is American. 
 C.J.: There's nothing more American than coalition building. The first thing 
John Wayne always did was put together a posse. 
Of course, Bush’s assertion that ‘you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists’ 
attempted to force wavering or indifferent states to explicitly back the US-led response of a 
‘War on Terror’.  And at this particular moment, then Secretary of State Colin Powell was 
investing considerable political capital in attempts to court General Musharraf’s Pakistan.  
That such efforts could be constructed and viewed as a quintessentially all American act of 
putting together posse was useful in light of the fact that such an act could equally (and 
relatively easily) be viewed as straightforward hypocrisy.  As Daalder and Lindsay note, aid 
to Pakistan went from $9 million in the three years before 9-11 to $4.3 billion in the three 
years after the events of September 11th 2001.46 Welcoming Musharraf back into the 
international community, after designating Pakistan a pariah state following his military coup 
of 1999, could very easily have been framed as the logic of a narrow, amoral realpolitik, in 
which concerns for ‘freedom’ mattered very little.  Third, the pupils are told why the US must 
take action in Afghanistan, by simply replacing Bush’s harbouring metaphor with that of 
‘incubator’.  After Bush had argued, ‘we will make no distinction between terrorists and the 
states who harbour them’, The West Wing confirmed the ineluctable link between terrorists 
and their host states. 
 Boy 1: Where do terrorists come from?  
 Josh:  Where do they come from? 
 Sam: Everywhere. Mostly they come from exactly where you'd expect: places 
of abject poverty and despair. Horribly impoverished places are an 
incubator for the worst kind of crime. 
As Charlie goes on to explain, it is no different from the gangs of ‘South Central L.A., 
Detroit, the South Bronx’ and ‘Southeast D.C.’.  Linking the present threat to wars – gang 
wars, war on drugs – that Americans are familiar with and understand the necessity in 
fighting helps to naturalise an assertive, interventionist American response to 9-11.  Having 
already invested hundreds of millions of dollars in lengthy conflicts abroad and faced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Brief History of the Department of Homeland Security’, (2008), accessed 
December 10, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief_documentary_history_of_dhs_2001_2008.pdf. 
44 Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: What 9-11 Revealed About America. (Cornwall: MPG Books, 2007). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ivan Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. (New York; 
[Chichester]: Wiley, 2005). 
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repeated news coverage of gang wars at home, Americans had already been exposed to 
arguments that such ‘wars’ were clearly in the national interest and for the greater good.  It 
was an analogy that resonated as it contextualised the new threat for Americans by drawing 
on an old threat with which they were already familiar and used to fighting.  As one reviewer 
of ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ noted, ‘while all the characters gave amazing performances, there 
were a few standouts. Charlie's comparison of terrorist camps and gangs was really well 
written’.47  Ironically, for this reviewer, such articulations were useful in teaching Americans 
‘what can’t be learned in classrooms’.48 
 
4.3 What should we do, as Citizens? 
Informed of who the terrorists are, what they want and what America should do, the third 
major question that ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ asks is: ‘What should we do, as citizens?’  The 
answer again takes three forms.  First, the pupils learn that, as Americans, they should not 
worry (despite having begun the lesson by learning that terrorists want to kill them all), 
continue to put faith in their education and continue to believe in liberal values such as 
pluralism.  
Josh:  But listen, don't worry about all this right now. We got you covered. Worry 
about school. Worry about what you're gonna tell your parents when you 
break curfew. You're gonna meet guys, you're gonna meet girls... Learn things. 
Be good to each other. Read the newspapers, go to the movies, go to a party. 
Read a book. In the meantime, remember pluralism. You want to get these 
people? I mean, you really want to reach in and kill them where they live? 
Keep accepting more than one idea. Makes 'em absolutely crazy. 
All of this was, of course, supposedly the correct response because the government are 
responsible for and capable of keeping Americans safe; politics, terrorism and war should be 
left to the experts, citizens should uphold (liberal) American values and identity.  To this end, 
The West Wing spoke in tandem with Bush’s insistence that ordinary Americans should ‘live 
your lives and hug your children’.49  And, while the liberal values advocated might not be 
shared with the Bush Administration, there were also clear parallels with official (neo)liberal 
calls to respond by continuing to shop as normal.50  Through such calls, the official response 
of the Bush Administration and that offered by The West Wing constructed and reaffirmed an 
enabling and dangerous division between the personal and political.  Second, despite the 
overtly ‘liberal response’ being put forward, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ confirms that it is normal to 
feel angry and to seek violent retribution.  The West Wing gives voice to a common theme in 
American society during the post 9-11 void: the desire to realise the Jacksonian logic of the 
counter-punch.51  In fusing love and anger, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ adopted a strikingly similar 
tone to Bush’s official announcements on terror.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kickdoor ‘What can’t be learned in classrooms’, TV.com, (2010), accessed December 10, 2010, 
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48 Ibid. 
49 George. W. Bush, ‘Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, Capitol Building, 
Washington D.C. September 20, 2001. 
50 Ibid. 
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 Josh:  I'd put 'em in a small cell, and make them watch home movies of the 
birthdays and baptisms and weddings of every single person they killed, 
over and over, every day, for the rest of their lives [clears his throat]. And 
then they'd get punched in the mouth every night at bedtime. By a 
different person, every night. There'd be a long list of volunteers, but that's 
all right. We'll wait... 
 
Third, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ closes on what was one of the defining juxtapositions in the 
official narrative of the response to 9-11 and a theme commonplace throughout American 
media and society.  The fusing of American exceptionalism with individual acts of heroism – 
from fire fighters, the police and the passengers of United 93 in particular – was a recurrent 
theme in Bush’s speeches.52  American exceptionalism – the belief that America is unique 
and superior – was central to American foreign policy in the response to 9-11, as it had been 
during the 1990s, Cold War and Second World War before.53  What was unusual in American 
foreign policy after 9-11 was the degree to which these perceived national qualities were tied 
to the actions of individuals.  For instance, not only was America attacked because of its 
exceptional nature (‘we are the brightest beacon of freedom in the world’), but the attacks 
were also seen to bring out the best in America and encourage ‘everyday acts of 
exceptionalism’ in ordinary Americans.  One frequently deployed strategy, was to contrast 
this exceptionalism – as manifest in the individual acts of heroism witnessed on 9-11 – with 
the cowardice of America’s enemies.  The question of whether suicide bombers were 
‘cowardly’ had been a politically charged topic in the shadow of the fall of the Twin 
Towers.54  The West Wing correspondingly saved this topic for the show’s close and the wise 
words of President Bartlett: 
 Boy 1: Well, don't you consider...I mean, I know they're our enemy, but don't you 
consider there's something noble about being a martyr?  
 Bartlett: A martyr would rather suffer death at the hands of an oppressor than 
renounce his beliefs. Killing yourself and innocent people to make a point 
is sick, twisted, brutal, dumb-ass murder. And let me leave you with this 
thought ... we don't need martyrs right now. We need heroes. A hero 
would die for his country but he'd much rather live for it... 
Juxtaposing American heroes and cowardly martyrs, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ closed once again 
by reinforcing and amplifying one of the key themes of the official response to 9-11.  Just as 
Bush frequently brought ‘good Americans’ and ‘evil terrorists’ together in official narratives 
for maximum impact through juxtaposition, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ did likewise.  Indeed, the 
tendency toward moral absolutes and American exceptionalism in The West Wing after 9-11 
was so great, and the tendency for Presidents Bush and Bartlett to converge in narratives so 
frequent, that some analysts have dubbed Sorkin’s fictionalised but increasingly hybrid White 
House ‘the Bushlet Administration’.55 
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Building, Washington D.C. September 20, 2001.  See also Jackson, Writing. 
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Palgrave, 2003). 
54 See, for example, James Der Derian, "The War of Networks". In Worlds in Collision, eds. Booth, K. (New 
York: Palgrave, 2002). 
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16	  
	  
5. Television and (Im)possibility 
The possibility of the ‘War on Terror’ was inevitably reliant upon ‘a background of 
social/discursive practices and meanings’; such a background ‘makes possible the practices 
as well as the social actors themselves’.56  Understanding how the ‘War on Terror’ came ‘to 
appear necessary’ and ‘the only reasonable course of action’, whereas alternatives were 
rendered ‘unthinkable’, requires an appreciation of ‘the way in which power works to 
constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions’.57  By helping to 
establish, what would become a largely agreed upon, background of discursive meanings, 
The West Wing through the ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ episode contributed to the possibility of the 
‘War on Terror’ and actively shut down the scope for debate in American politics and society 
after 9-11.   
 
Alternative voices were silenced by the amplification of official narratives.  Of course, The 
West Wing was far from alone in this enterprise.  Hayes and Guardino have noted that, in 
news coverage, ‘Bush administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the 
voices of anti-war groups and opposition Democrats were barely audible, and the overall 
thrust of coverage favoured a pro-war perspective’.58  And, after 9-11, the new context of the 
‘War on Terror’ was frequently reflected and re-affirmed in television shows such as MI-
5/Spooks and 24.59  What makes ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ noteworthy then is that the episode is 
explicitly written to respond to the events of 9-11 from a liberal perspective and it does so 
before any other entertainment television show of a similar nature.  The show contributed to 
the rapid narrowing of the space from which alternative narratives could be put forward.  The 
openness of the void, which was so quickly closed down, had initially enabled some 
alternative, critical and dissenting voices to be heard: 
“It’s not a surprise … No, it’s not all that far-fetched”. 
“I think Bin Laden is basically a genius”. 
“… all he [President Bush] uses are buzz words like evil, good, resolve and you’d 
think he was talking about a Star Wars movie or something”. 
“It has nothing to do with freedom whatsoever … this might happen again so long as 
our policy towards the Middle East doesn’t change”. 
“The American people aren’t thinking”. 
“I can sort of understand where Bin Laden is coming from … I’m not necessarily 
proud to be an American … it will be a slightly longer version of the Oklahoma City 
bombing”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Roxanne Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Policy in the Philippines', International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993): 298. 
57 Ibid, 297-299. 
58 Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, ‘Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in 
Iraq’, Political Communication 27, no. 1 (2010): 59. 
59 Christian Erickson, ‘Thematics of Counterterrorism: Comparing 24 and MI-5/Spooks’, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 1, no. 3 (2008): 343-358. 
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“… well, don’t people die every day?”60 
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ contributed to the establishment of increasingly dominant discourses that 
marginalised these alternatives, acquiescing and co-opting potential oppositional voices.  This 
can be seen not only in the rapid disappearance of alternative voices amongst the general 
public but also in overwhelming bipartisan support for Government policies after 9-11.  The 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists was opposed with only 
one vote against (Democrat Congresswoman Barbara Lee) compared to the five hundred and 
eighteen supporting votes the resolution received from across party lines in both houses of 
Congress.  In this context, The West Wing episode ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ can and should then be 
read as an important moment in the transition from void to crisis, as the meaning of 9-11 
slowly harmonised across American society and the Bush Administration established a 
hegemonic foreign policy discourse that would come to underpin the subsequent ‘War on 
Terror’.61 
  
In three principle and related ways, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ helped to make the ‘War on Terror’ 
possible and to make alternative responses less likely.  First, Sorkin’s script clearly placed the 
government at the centre of key relationships in a post 9-11 world.  With government agency 
(and a monopoly on the use of violence) having been challenged so directly by the events of 
September 11th, re-locating and re-concentrating agency at the heart of government was an 
important move for the Bush Administration.  And it was aided by The West Wing.  By 
positioning government officials as the only people who can understand and fight terrorists, 
simultaneously explaining events to the public and keeping them safe, ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ 
places the Bush/Bartlett Administration as both the link and barrier between the public and 
terrorism.  The ambiguity of this dual role ensures agency is located at the heart of 
government and citizens are reliant on elected officials for the information that guides 
security policy and the safety those policies supposedly bring.  ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ 
encourages the role of government as judge, jury and executioner on the terrorist threat. 
 
Second, this (re-)elevation of the government to a position of ‘sovereign protector’ through 
both knowledge and ability is reinforced by a ‘recognition’ that the response to terror is 
particularly challenging and will require great minds.  This is backed up by the fact that in 
‘Isaac and Ishmael’ the show’s stars are shown to be those minds teaching an informed but 
uncertain public.  Third, the episode thus confirms that the role of the public is to listen to 
those government officials who are ‘experts’, have the knowledge of and the capability to 
respond to terror that they themselves lack.  As has been shown, according to ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael’, the role of the public is to support officials by loving your family, your life and 
your country.  The decision to construct and perpetuate this distinction was not accidental.  
De Jonge reported from the set during filming that Sorkin instructed the characters to assert 
mastery of the facts.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 It is a sad reflection on the dangers of talking in the ‘War on Terror’ that have led me to anonymise these 
quotations, taken from interviews with ordinary American citizens conducted very shortly after 11 September 
2001.  All are available in the Witness and Response Collection at the Library of Congress and are respectively 
available on: SR375, September 13, 2001; SR375, September 13, 2001; SR381, September 15, 2001; SR381, 
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‘You don't have to be so somber and funereal. It's not a wake ... You're smart. You 
know these things. Here they are’.62 
This demonstration of knowledge is important in the transition from the post 9-11 void to a 
situation whereby understandings of terrorism are increasingly homogenised across society 
through the construction of 9-11 as crisis.   
 
Despite its scale, the shock it generated and its obvious significance for most Americans, 9-
11 was not self-evidently a crisis.63  To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 relied upon a double 
articulation: the simultaneous identification of both the problem (the morbid underlying 
condition the events represented) and the solution.  As Colin Hay has argued, crises rely upon 
a population being shown the solution to the impasse.64  To be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 
required a decisive intervention to be made, which articulated the events ‘as ‘symptom’-atic 
of a more general condition of crisis’ and a ‘War on Terror’, conducted through the agency of 
the American military led by President Bush, as the solution.65  This ‘decisive intervention’ 
was essential to fill the void and respond to 9-11 as a crisis.66  And it was a task aided and 
abetted by ‘Isaac and Ishmael’. 
 
Arguably, of course, all of this is nothing new.  The rapid-fire and intelligent nature of the 
dialogue is part of the show’s attraction for its fan base, and as Michelle Mouton argues The 
West Wing generally validates the ‘codes, desires and aspirations of the educated professional 
class’.67  Perhaps it should not be surprising that The West Wing helped to fill the post 9-11 
void by amplifying dominant narratives and assisting in the construction of 9-11 as crisis. 
However, there have been important instances of The West Wing confronting and challenging 
dominant narratives to imagine alternative possible futures.68  No better example of this exists 
than the prophetic seventh series, in which an overtly liberal, Hispanic candidate with soaring 
campaign rhetoric successfully overcomes the odds and expectations to win the presidential 
election.  The character, Matt Santos (played by Jimmy Smits), was modelled on a young, 
liberal and little-known Senator.  That Senator – Barack Obama – went on to win the real-
world presidency in 2008, creating a strong sense of déjà vu for many who had watched The 
West Wing and cries that life was imitating art, imitating life.  As this brief example and the 
preceding discussion highlight, entertainment television can both confirm and challenge; it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Sorkin, cited in Peter De Jonge, ‘Aaron Sorkin Works His Way Through the Crisis’, New York Times, 
October 28, 2001. 
63 Croft, Crisis; Holland, ‘From Void to Crisis’. 
64 Colin Hay, 'Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the `Winter of Discontent'', Sociology 30, no. 2 
(1996): 253-277. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Croft, Crisis. 
67 Michelle Mouton, ‘Victorian Parliamentary Novels, The West Wing and Professionalism’, in The West Wing: 
The American Presidency as Television Drama, eds. Rollins, P. and O’Connor, J. (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2003), 187-202. 
68 See, Ballard, ‘Haven’t We’; Brendan Carlin, George Jones and Toby Helm, ‘Blair’s Whips Fooled by West 
Wing Plot’, The Telegraph, February 2, 2006, accessed December 10, 2010, 
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has the potential to close down or open up space for debate in politics and society.  And that 
is why ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ remains so disappointing, disturbing and dangerous. 
 
Conclusion 
In reaction to the more vitriolic criticism that was launched at ‘Isaac and Ishmael’, Aaron 
Sorkin agreed that the episode might not have been The West Wing at its best but also by 
denying that it mattered or that it was even an episode of The West Wing at all.   
‘Some sort of respect had to be paid to the event that just happened ... We couldn't 
just do a regular 'West Wing.' I don't think that it was a good episode of 'The West 
Wing.' I don't think it was an episode of 'The West Wing.' I don't even know if it was 
good television. It was well intended, it was never meant to teach anything, to be 
preachy’.69 
‘... the show had to bow its head somehow before it moved forward’.70  
Executive Producer Thomas Schlamme confirms that the episode, inclusive of its limitations, 
was very much a product of that moment: 
‘We can remember the absolute visceral feeling that we all had those two weeks after 
Sept. 11 -- that episode was a product of those feelings. George W. Bush becoming 
president instead of Al Gore doesn't affect the show at all. But the pain of the nation 
and the pain that we all felt does affect the show a little bit. So it took awhile for us to 
find our sea legs’.71 
Similarly, this paper has argued that ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ was a product of the moment and 
also a powerful mechanism through which the moment was constructed in the terms set out 
by the Bush Administration.  It helped to settle some of the unease that characterised 
American society, filling the void in meaning that followed the events in Pennsylvania, 
Virginia and New York.  Having helped to establish 9-11 as crisis by reproducing emerging 
and increasingly dominant narratives, Sorkin has been adamant that NBC should not re-air 
the episode; it should remain something to be watched once and then locked away, never to 
be seen again.   
 
And yet, of course, the episode can be purchased to view, standing outside of the usual 
sequence and storylines, again and again.  The exceptionalism of 9-11 can be revisited, along 
with a purportedly ‘liberal response’ that reinforces dominant narratives, every time ‘Isaac 
and Ishmael is viewed’, out of continuity, by new and loyal viewers of The West Wing.  
Moreover, the narrowing performed by the foreign policy positions articulated and performed 
in ‘Isaac and Ishmael’ does not stand alone.  Rather, as Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger have 
argued, the foreign policy of The West Wing was frequently ‘more hawkish than that of the 
Bush administration’ and these ‘messages matter; they matter in real and political ways’.72  
What Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger do not mention is that this was not always the case, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Sorkin cited in Pat Nason, ‘West Wing Boss Relieved 2001 is Past’, UPI, September 6, 2002. 
70 Sorkin cited in Bill Keveney, ‘Political powerhouse made TV history’, USA Today, May 10, 2006. 
71 Cited in Daniel Coleridge, ‘Why Bush Refused West Wing Invite’, TV Guide Online, April 14, 2002. 
72 Gans-Boriskin and Tisinger, ‘The Bushlet Administration’, 100. 
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rather that, like many American politicians and citizens, The West Wing became more 
hawkish on foreign policy after the events of September 11th 2001.  Just as ‘Isaac and 
Ishmael’ was a product and important contributor to the political context of the post 9-11 
moment, so other episodes are inevitably produced through the complex interactions of the 
show’s director’s liberal leanings and the political circumstances of the time.  
 
It is only necessary to consider the measured, unemotional arguments on foreign policy put 
forward in the show’s third ever episode titled ‘A Proportional Response’ to appreciate this 
transition.  Here, President Bartlet is slowly led away from a desire to blow terrorists ‘off the 
face of the earth with the fury of God’s own thunder’; he literally learns appropriate foreign 
policy behaviour based on ‘what our father’s taught us’.  After 9-11, as the Bush 
Administration constructed a new era, replete with new and unprecedented dangers, which 
required new strategies, The West Wing followed suit.  Early calls for a ‘proportional 
response’ to terrorism stand in marked contrast to the plotlines that followed 9-11.  It is 
apparent that the events of September 11th had a dramatic impact on the show, the context in 
which the show aired, and on the broadly liberal views that informed plotlines.  Initial, 
generally liberal, concerns with responding appropriately in line with a respect for precedent 
and international law rapidly lost favour after 9-11, as instead the show turned to consider the 
need to step outside of international law with plots advocating the political assassination of 
leaders allied with terrorists.  Again, assisting the Bush Administration, The West Wing 
confirmed the exceptional nature of the post 9-11 world, in which a ‘war paradigm’ was 
required to keep us safe.  In this paradigm, it was accepted as necessary that the law may 
have to be suspended to ensure security. 
 
It is important that Political Scientists and International Relations take fictional dramas 
seriously.73  They exert considerable influence in shaping public opinion and can help to 
derail or to reinforce the official policies of elected officials.  They are also an important 
gauge, driver and reflector of ‘real world’ political currents of thought.  As ‘softer’ liberal 
arguments lost out in post 9-11 America to the ‘hard Wilsonian’ positions advocated by neo-
conservatives – famously described by Irving Kristol as liberals mugged by reality – The 
West Wing helped to imitate and initiate this crucial transition.  As the official narratives and 
policy of the Bush Administration were put forward, The West Wing gave credence to the 
particular and contingent vision they offered, helping to contextualise the terror threat and 
naturalise the response they entailed for the American public.  This was done by using 
established characters and a carefully crafted script to ensure that both Bush’s and Bartlet’s 
‘War on Terror’ would resonate at home.  
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